Chapter one
The features of the relationship between Egypt and
Nile basin countries
1.
Historical background:-
-Historically, Egypt
was considered an African rather than an Arab state. And its relations with
south of the Nile valley and Central Africa have continued ever since. It is
possible to view the geopolitical regional relations between Egypt and the
states of the African Horn and the Nile basin in such a way that they could be
considered conducive to cooperation in peacetime, but a point of pressure that
might threaten the Egyptian entity in case of war or the threat of it.
The first aspect of
this relationship resulted when the Red Sea became an important international
waterway and centers of interest of the international powers, hence the
necessity for Egyptian, Arab and African cooperation by virtue of the long
African and Western shorelines on this very Sea, The second aspect was imposed
by the water sources of the Nile, as Egypt relies entirely on the Nile River to
supply her need for fresh waters. Ethiopia claims a monopoly of supply by
consuming more than 80 percent of these sources. This is a fact that has set a
permanent goal for the Egyptian leadership to ensure the present flow of waters
of the Nile, The third aspect relates to the Nile River as an international
river crossing the borders of ten states of the Nile basin. Such international
nature of the river presents a grave challenge necessitating cooperation
between all riparian states for the management of sources of the river to
achieve the best utilization; the fourth aspect is reflected in the nature of
protracted conflicts in the African Horn of Africa, and East Africa,
particularly in Sudan, Somalia, northern Uganda, and the Great Lakes region.
The Nile water for Egypt, a
matter of life and death Unlike other basin States and the objective of
securing the top of the Nile water has always been its foreign policy but
reached to the extent that some people make him a god to worship, also the Nile
valley plays an important role in Egyptian-Nile
basin countries relations and
the achievement of integration because
it is the primary resource of water and Came to be regarded as a water variable because the nile river is one of the main factors that threaten the good-neighborly
relations and regional cooperation among the
riparian States of
international river
basins and in the light
of the increasing role of water variable in contemporary international politics.
The Nile river respect in terms of topographic[1] with two properties: -
First: - River Nile took complete control over the economy and the lives of the Egyptian state, so Egypt's political strength is directly proportional to the amount of water available to them, and the national income equals the income of the water almost.
First: - River Nile took complete control over the economy and the lives of the Egyptian state, so Egypt's political strength is directly proportional to the amount of water available to them, and the national income equals the income of the water almost.
Second: - Egypt is the biggest beneficiary of the Nile is not having any of the follow-up to make it always keen in its relations with the rest of the other States where there are follow up and pursue a policy of flexible and a bit about the internal conflicts and regional and international levels. The Nile Basin countries, nine have only The interests of limited or marginal with the exception of Sudan and the principle of ensuring that the form of Nile water a fundamental principle of the Group of Eight principles on which the Egyptian national security through successive historical eras.
2.
The Egyptian role factors:-
-The Egyptian role in Nile basin region as a part of
Africa relies on different factors that establish the importance of the
Egyptian presence in Africa. Prominent among those are a) its geographic
location; b) its historical and socio-cultural heritage and links; c) its
national interests; and d) its financial and political clout.
Geographical, Egypt lies
at the downstream end of the basin. The country receives hardly any rainfall,
and depends on the Nile for almost all its direct water requirements, including
agriculture, domestic and industrial supplies, navigation, and tourism. This
description implies that Egypt is located in Africa, and it is therefore a
country of Nile basin countries (Sudan-Burundi-Ethiopia-Kenya-Rwanda-Tanzania-Uganda-Eretria-D.R
Congo).
With regard to its historical and socio-cultural
heritage and links, Egypt is largely an Arab-Islamic state. Although Egypt, as
the rest of Africa, was only arabised and/or islamicised, both Arabism and
Islam have come to be rooted in Egyptian history and social-cultural fabric and
imaginary. So much so that taking Egypt from any of these two entities today
will mean an amputated Islamic or Arab world. The Cairo-based AL-AZHAR
UNIVERSITY is arguably the oldest (more than a thousand years) and the most
prestigious centre of Islamic scholarship in the world. And if one were to take
away the Egyptian contribution to contemporary Arabic language and literature
you would surely leave that language a lame man.
It is these two factors that largely inform Egypt’s
national interest, which is the third factor that defines a country’s foreign
policy. From its geographical location bordering the NILE BASIN countries, and
its social-historical (Arab-Islamic) links to the countries of this region,
events that happen in this part of the world are susceptible to impact either
positively or negatively on Egypt’s national security and economic, Political stability
in this region is therefore of great concern for Egyptian national security and
thus national interest. Also, given its limited natural resources and the
abundance of these resources in a number of countries of this region.
From its location north of the
Nile Basin and its dependence on the Nile River for its very existence,
ensuring the continuous flow of the Nile waters from countries of its origin, namely
Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia, is one of key national interest concerns for Egypt.
And of course, maintaining its friendly relationship with the United Sates, the
world’s only superpower, and the generous financial assistance that has estimated
at more than $50 bn since 1978) is another key of foreign policy objective that
Egypt considers part of its national interest.
Finally, the fourth factor that
defines a country’s foreign policy, one must not forget that Egypt is a Third World
African state with limited economic resources at its disposal (but relatively
prosperous within Africa), and that is politically rivaled by other actors on
all of its geographical borders. The financial and political weight that a
country carries may constitute an advantage or a constraint on that country’s
foreign policy choices and actions. Egypt’s financial and political status constitutes
both.
With regard to this status
constituting a constraint on Egypt’s foreign policy actions in Africa, it is
worth noting that countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya rival Egypt and spearhead
initiatives that Egypt could do in order to have a more noticeable
Africa-focused foreign policy and also tend to exclude Egypt from the club of
Nile basin countries. This is largely informed by the fear of these countries
of Egyptian domination. Another reason of this situation may also be the fact
that they were all under domination and still maintain close ties with London
and Paris, which is not the case for Egypt. Egypt is considered as African and
country would want to preserve the leadership role in that region.
3.
The
issue of Nile water
-In
addition, the issue of Nile water grows in gravity in regional relations for
the states of the basin for a number of reasons. First, no real organization
exists among the states of the basin to allow for a dialogue to determine the
distribution and exploitation of the Nile water. Second, there exists real
competition among states of the Nile basin over the production of specific
crops for export; especially cotton which needs enormous amounts of water.
Third, the ongoing enmities and conflicts between states of the basin, and the
intra-state civil wars, which have created opportunities for instability and
frequent manipulation by external powers, continue to undermine their own
interests and the interests of the area Bearing all this in mind, the
importance of the Nile water to Egypt – particularly if a number of
interrelated issues are addressed – cannot be underestimated. First, according
to the statistics of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources,
the Nile alone supplies 94 percent of total water resources of the country. As (graph
1)[2] shows, of Egypt’s total
area of 1,001,450 sq. km, more than 326,000 sq. km. or 33 percent of the
territory fall within the Nile River basin[3]. The percentage of Egypt’s
population in the Nile River basin accounts for more than 85 percent compared
to the other basin states’ population percentages such as Uganda (75 percent),
Sudan (74 percent), and Rwanda (72 percent).
Second, Egypt is
preoccupied with a shortage of water resources in addition to the increase in
population and the adoption of economic development projects. The Nile waters
can be considered the main resource for irrigation. It is also used for other
purposes such as transportation, industry and tourism. It is estimated that an
increase in population in three Nile River states namely, Egypt, Sudan and
Ethiopia, will reach more than 200 million in the year 2015, which means an
increase in the demand for Nile water[4] .If the current water
policies persist, each of these three states would seek to increase its share
at the expense of the other states Third, the international dimension appears
crucial in designing Egyptian water policies. Considering that Egypt’s water
resources mainly come from beyond its borders, the increase in these sources
should be achieved within the framework of coordination with the other
governments of the River states. There is no doubt that this places Egypt in a
serious and vulnerable situation while designing her water policies, with
respect to her inability to control the projects designed to preserve water
along the banks of the White Nile. It is essential for Egypt’s survival that
there is an uninterrupted flow of the Nile water into Lake Nasser amounting to
18 milliard cubic meters annually. The flow of the Nile River waters can be utilized
jointly with Sudan, after the application of four phases in Upper Nile,
particularly in Jongli I, Jongli II, Machar Marches swamps, and Gazelle Nile.
Egypt depends largely on the implementation of these projects in order to face
the increasing demand on the water. Egypt’s vulnerability is also explained by
the amount of rainfall the country receives in the Nile River basin, the main
basket area for the country’s agriculture since Pharaoh’s time. (Table 2)[5] indicates that Egypt
receives the lowest amount of rainfall in the basin compared to the rest of the
riparian states.
Table 2: Nile River
Basin States ‘Average Rainfall
|
COUNTRY
|
Average Rainfall
in the Basin Minimum (mm/year)
|
Average Rainfall
in the Basin maximum (mm/year)
|
|
BURUNDI
DRCONGO
EGYPT
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
RWANDA
SUDAN
TANZANIA
UGANDA
|
895
875
0
540
205
505
840
0
625
395
|
1,570
1,915
120
665
2.100
1.790
1.935
1.610
1.630
2,060
|
The maximum average
rainfall of only 120mm per year is the least in the region, a situation, which
over the centuries has forced Egypt to irrigate more land for its agricultural
production. Table 3 shows that land irrigated by Egypt in the Nile River basin
is almost twice the land irrigated by the other riparian states combined. Table
2 also shows that most of the Nile River basin countries namely, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda,
Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, have so far not adequately utilized the river
for irrigation. However, these countries receive more rain as compared to
Egypt.
-But
it is clear nowadays the change in the hydro politics[6] and the challenges that
will face Egypt as a result of this change, since 1999 comprehensive efforts have been made toward
the development of a new Nile Basin regime called the Nile Basin Initiative
(NBI). The NBI is a partnership initiated and run by the riparian states of the
Nile River through the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin
states (NBI 2010). All riparian states of the Nile Basin are included in the
NBI, except for Eritrea, which has observer status.
The
objectives of the NBI are to:-
• develop
the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure
prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples;
• ensure
efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources;
• ensure
cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win
gains;
• target
poverty eradication and promote economic integration; and
• ensure
that the program results in a move from planning to action. (NBI 2010)
The NBI
tries to develop the river basin by implementing a broad approach, using
different tools at different levels. At the international level, the NBI
intends to promote a shared vision among all riparians. This Shared Vision
Project (SVP) includes “grants-based activities to foster trust and in
promoting cooperative and integrated water resource management among the Nile
Basin riparians. The ratification of a legal agreement is the first step in
this direction. The Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is the key element
for the formation of the new regime and the most contentious part of the regime
negotiations. Once ratified, the CFA is expected to replace the 1929 and 1959
agreements and therefore implement a new legal entity for allocating the Nile’s
waters. The dispute over the CFA originates from the question of maintaining
the legal–political status quo of existing water allocation. Egypt, as it can
be imagined, would not light-mindedly hand in the agreements that are
beneficiary for its own status quo. Clearly, the preexisting regimes present
huge obstacles to formation of a new regime in the Nile Basin.
The World Bank and
the Canadian International Development Agency are the donors most involved in
the NBI process. The Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF), established in 2003, is
managed by the World Bank and encompasses most of the international donor
support. It is unlikely that the NBI would have come to life without the strong
international (donor) support. “As such, donor support in the establishment and
evolution of the NBI is considered to have been crucial and indispensable. But
because of its over-reliance on multilateral donors, the NBI has also been
frequently portrayed by several critical voices as excessively donor-driven”
Yet, without international technical, financial, and political support, it is
unlikely that the NBI would have come this far. This clearly demonstrates the
importance of international actors in the formation of a new water regime.
Considering that the
hydropolitical situation has been in a legal–political deadlock for decades,
recent developments in the Nile Basin have shown that the downstream countries,
Egypt in particular, are willing to put some effort into cooperation, through
their support of selected upstream water development projects. This development
can be interpreted as “a partial shift in the behavior of the states in the
Eastern Nile basin. They now at least to some degree accept one another’s
political concerns and national interests”[7]. However, the size and
scope of this first set of projects does not threaten Egypt’s hydro political
status quo. Still it shows that the “old school” of political thinking might be
softening, especially with regard to the need for cooperation among riparian
states.
While Egypt has been
able to maintain its hydro political position for many decades, exploiting the
water resources for its own economic development, this position of power within
the Basin and in the region as a whole is now being questioned: in May 2010,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda signed the new CFA, while the
signatures of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are expected in
the next few months. This movement marks a giant step forward in achieving a
legal status for cooperation in the Nile Basin, including formation of a new
international water regime and the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC). Once the
CFA is ratified, the NRBC will supersede the NBI. However, both Egypt and Sudan
have announced that they might not sign this version of the CFA, since it
threatens the status quo of current water allocations. Both developments usher
in a clear shift in the hydro-hegemonic positions in the basin.
As will be shown
later on, current trends indicate an increase in the demand for fresh water in
the Nile Basin, and therefore an increasing potential for conflict. Upstream
riparians have, until recently, not shown much interest in developing their
water resources for various reasons, including lack of financial resources, and
weak political and economic capacity. This situation is slowly changing clearly
challenging Egypt’s hydropolitical position. As political stability has
increased recently in upstream countries, they are poised to withdraw more
water from the Nile in order to develop their agriculture and overall
economies. We can proceed on the assumption that with stronger upstream
interests in Nile waters, a conflict between upstream and downstream users may
be set in motion, creating a window of opportunity for Basin-wide agreements
Thus, it becomes
clear that Egyptian national interests are closely related to the Nile Resources
region, which represents a strategic depth for Egypt. This heavy dependence on
fresh water from the Nile River means that any threat to the flow of the water
translates into a fundamental threat to Egyptian security. Therefore, the idea
of securing the Nile resources is of paramount importance to the Egyptian
foreign policymaking establishment, and a source of Cairo’s geo-strategic
interests and consistency in foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis the riparian
countries in the Nile River basin.
Chapter 2
Egypt’s
strategic role in Africa and the challenges
To measure a country’s role in
another country or a set of countries, one needs to take
Into account the contribution
that the acting country makes to what the partner country or Countries consider
as important issues to them. And here one can identify a number of Issues of
particular importance to Nile basin countries and analyze the role played by
Egypt on these Issues.
The international
relations passed with different stages during different times with different
attitude and different political conditions, Egypt was during fifties and
sixties Led by revolutionary government, this government policy based on the Liberation from
colonialism so this policy faced welcome from the rest of the region’s
countries that were under the domination of the colonization so during that
time Egypt was a vital resource for these countries by provide All forms of possible
support to these liberation movements in Africa and the Nile basin region ,whether
political and financial support or the Logistic by provide weapons and Munitions or technical support to provide military
training to the components of resistance
movements or media support by Broadcasting router from Cairo to the different African countries with their local
languages that left for Egypt a high balance among the people of these
countries , corroborating reflected till now in the different African capitals
till today in the streets called ABDEL-NASSER or cities like SUEZ or CAIRO, but
after this countries gained its independence their orientations became
different from looking for independence to looking for development so the
Egyptian role in the fifties and sixties became no longer improbable , so here
was the turning point in the features of the Egyptian role in the Nile basin
region and Africa as whole and the transition to the new stage with different
tools. Ambassador Mona Omar , Emad Awad mentioned that the new role focus on
provide technical and scientific support to serve the Process of human development in the
different activities by send doctors and university professors, Technicians and
Azhar, church missions also from another side to improve the process of human development,
Egypt also in 1980 has established the Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation with Africa To
be entrusted with
the coordination of the various forms of technical
support and humanitarian and
logistical support to African countries ,
Includes organizing training courses for African trainees in
various fields such as medicine,
nursing, police and the press and
media, agriculture, irrigation , and
provision of humanitarian relief , medical
assistance in the cases of catastrophes, the fund signed more than 61 Bilateral
cooperation agreements and 31 Trilateral Cooperation agreement, but this
countries want to achieve development so beside the technical cooperation they
need a high level of financial and industrial supports that we could not
provide during the last thirty years as well because of There
are a lot of issues attracted the Egyptian attention away from its regional role
toward the Nile basin countries.
During this phase, the beginning
of decline in the Egyptian role at Arab, African have been associated with the
beginning of the new stage with the most important variable has had a profound
impact on the decline this role, the peace initiative between Egypt and Israel,
the Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent signing of the peace
agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979 has resulted in this agreement that most Arab
countries severed relations with Egypt, which led to great confusion in the
region and then stopped the Arab-African Conference was attended by 65
countries, Arab, African that Egypt was the first supporter of it.
-Then
there was the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the disintegration in
the early nineties and private United
States-led new world order and
the rearrangement of regional systems
for the benefit of the United States.
-
The assassination attempt of president Hosny Moubark 1995 in Ethiopia (ADIS
ABABA) led to the president prevent to visit any Nile basin countries during the last fifteen year and also led him
to stop attend any African summit
-In Africa, the United States worked to ensure the superiority
of Israel over Arab countries , also worked to eliminate any attempt to possess
the power either to Iran or Iraq or Syria and then the first and second Gulf
War were the process translation of this trend and this policy led to decline and weaknesses
in the Egyptian regional role, especially after Egypt suffered from an economic
crisis in the eighties and early nineties because of the deteriorating of the
economic performance and the collapse of oil prices and a fall in revenues from
the Suez Canal and remittances from Egyptians abroad, as a result of this
challenges the
Egyptian attention attracted away from its regional rule toward the Nile basin
countries.
-The absence of the Egyptian
appearance in the Nile basin region is a result of the weakness of the Egyptian
capacity at the economic and the political, military culture there. This
weakness resulted from the absence of strategic vision resulting
from the lack of awareness of the importance of the
African cycle at Egypt's national security and in
particular the Department of the Nile Basin, Weak manifestation of the
universal force (economic - military - political - cultural - information) is a tool which depends upon any country to play a role on
the regional and international level. The decade of
the 1980s was one of external shocks (in the form of declines in oil prices,
high interest rates and general economic decline), in the world economy. For
example, in 1981, Egypt’s weighted average export price for crude petroleum
collapsed from $34 a barrel to $12 in May 1986. The Egyptian economy did not
respond adequately to these shocks. The consequence was massive fiscal and
current account deficits, which also paved the way for the accumulation of
external debt. Between 1980/81 and 1990/91, the country’s external debt
increased from $22.1 billion to $31.1 billion. At the same time, budget deficit
averaged 18% of GDP annually. The rate of inflation had risen to more than 20%
and open unemployment had risen to about 10% by 1990
As a
result DR.MAHMOUD ABO EL ENIN AND DR.HWAIDA ABDEL- AZIM confirmed that in response to
the decline in the Egyptian economy during 1986-90 period, coupled with massive
fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation rates, negative interest
rates, accumulated external debt and high open unemployment, the Government of
Egypt (GOE) initiated the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme
(ERSAP) for the period 1991/92 – 1992/93 with support of World Bank, IMF, ADB
and other donors. The goals of ERSAP were: stabilization of the economy in
order to restore macroeconomic balance and reduce inflation; structural
adjustment to stimulate medium and long term growth; and modification of social
policies to minimize the adverse effects of economic reform on the poor and
vulnerable groups. The structural adjustment policies were aimed at reforming
public enterprises and liberalizing all prices, including interest rates. The
underlying assumption was that the introduction of market prices as a basis of
resource allocation would gradually pave the way for the emergence of a virile
private sector. So Egypt was preoccupied with the structural adjustment
programme to survive and it was no place in the Egyptian chest to contain the
Nile basin region demands and needs.
This weakness is not
attributed to the absence of devices operating in Africa, there are a numerous
of counterparts working and operating in Africa , but lack of strategy and
ability to take political decisions in a timely manner, it is necessary to
recognize that the multiplicity of the Egyptian counterparts working in the
field of African without coordination between them in the framework of a clear
strategy constitutes one of the factors important to block any efforts to
report the Egyptian interests in Africa ,by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the ministries of foreign trade and higher education, culture, media, economy,
defense and interior, Al-Azhar and the Church , the associations of businessmen,
it is clear that each device operates according to perceptions, and this would
conflict perceptions and dispersal of resources and go all these efforts.
Also the internal
factors play a major rule look like the external factors , DR.SOAD MOHAMED confirmed
that During the last ten years Egypt has tried to improve its role in Africa
and specially in the Nile basin region as an important part in the continent
that Egypt belong to, but this attempts were weak because of the severe decline
in the Egyptian economic and political capacity as noted above, as well as the
injury of the political system in Egypt with a several disabled because of the absence of democracy and human
rights violations and widespread corruption, and the combination of wealth and
power and the spread of poverty, increased unemployment, low wages, high prices
and the spread of the protest movements of groups of socially marginalized to
claim their rights and the absence of institutions playing the real role (the
legislative institution - Persecution of power advocated the independence of
the judiciary , with the absence of a real role of organizations of civil
society and political parties led by poor and closed on itself by the actor is
a tool for the police system .All these problems that afflicted the Egyptian people discovered their dissatisfaction with the existing regime and its policies and its lack of
legitimacy because of rigging the election that led to losing the strong role
externally, there is no doubt that there is a close relationship between the
strength inside and outside force, and vice versa.
Chapter
three
-The
Israeli and foreign intervention in the Nile basin countries affairs
The
features and characteristic of the Israeli appearance in Nile basin countries
The gradual resumption of diplomatic relations
between Israel and Africa during the 1980s was a function, primarily, of the
growing African disappointment with the Arab world and deteriorating conditions
on the continent. Two carefully prepared meetings in the mid- 1970s between
then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and
Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire signaled some movement. The signing of
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, which removed the ostensible reason
for the rupture of relations in 1973, provided added impetus. But little
progress was achieved until the early 1980s, when David Kimche was appointed
director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, together with Avi
Primor (then head of the Africa Desk), embarked on a campaign to achieve a
diplomatic rapprochement.
A series of visits by Israeli leaders to various
African states, notably by then Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon, set the stage for the new Israeli effort. Private
businessmen who had established themselves in various Nile basin capitals (Leon
Tamman in Kinshasa, adis ababa ) were pressed into service. Military contacts
were increased and contracts negotiated.
While economic and defense ties continued apace,
movement on the diplomatic front, however, proved to be exceedingly slow. In
May 1982, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, anxious to capitalize on Israel’s
relations with Washington, became the first African head of state to announce
the restoration of relations with Israel. By the early 1990s only three Nile
basin states, Guinea, Ethiopia, and Kenya—resumed relations.
During the course of the 1980s, as Israeli interests
in the Far East expanded dramatically, relations with Nile basin countries
continued to develop extremely slowly along these dualistic, and palpably
utilitarian, lines. Israeli entrepreneurs were visible everywhere; some became
informal advisers to heads of state in Nairobi, , Addis Ababa, and Kinshasa.
Senior officers turned businessmen were involved in operations on different
sides of conflicts in Rwanda and Zaire. Inevitably leading to immense confusion
not easily dispelled by official protestations.
By the late 1980s, nevertheless, the Israeli
presence on the continent had expanded once again, Trade relations, although
still infinitesimal, grew; cultural contacts blossomed with the commencement of
religious pilgrimages to Israel; academic exchanges increased; tourism
flourished. A new equilibrium, admittedly devoid of the passion that had
characterized the early years, was forged.
The last fifteen years have been marked by the
complete diplomatic return of Israel to Africa. It has also been characterized
by growing official Israeli indifference to the deteriorating situation on the
continent, only somewhat mitigated by the emergence of Israeli and Jewish NGOs
concerned with the ongoing African predicament. Despite massive changes in
Israeli priorities and African circumstances, no comprehensive strategic review
has been carried out, rendering the Israeli-African relationship as privatized
and haphazard today as in recent decades.
The diplomatic turnabout of recent years was
facilitated by two main factors. First and foremost, the Oslo Accords and the
peace treaty with Jordan removed the last political barriers that had prevented
a diplomatic rapprochement in the past. Second, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower magnified
the potential significance of the normalization of links with Israel in African
and Nile basin countries eyes. Israel established embassies in some of the Nile
basin states (Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo)
Indeed, the selective character of Israel’s
diplomatic ties in Africa mirrors shifting interests in recent years, rather
than any conscious policy reassessment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
refrained from taking the lead in shaping the new era in Israeli-African
relations. Most professional diplomats do not see their future in the African
arena. The turnover of personnel, with several notable exceptions, has been
rapid. The quality of those charged with managing African affairs has, sadly,
deteriorated, while even the best-intentioned have found that their bargaining
power within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as their access to
resources has been severely constricted.
While the technical cooperation program of MASHAV[8]
is still hailed as a key instrument of Israel’s Africa outreach, dwindling
portions of its already minute budget are allocated to the continent. The
Israeli aid program has become dependent on foreign financing and, at least to
some extent, on private business interests. Stopgap measures have too often
replaced ongoing programs. In the course of the past decade, numerous
delegations of parliamentarians and academics have been dispatched to a variety
of African states to compensate for the absence of a continuous presence on the
ground. Diplomats in Washington and at the UN have become surrogates for
permanent representatives in African capitals. Nongovernmental organizations
and individuals ranging from Magen David Adom and La’tet to the American Jewish
Committee, American Jewish World Service, and spontaneous groups formed to deal
with various calamities, such as the floods and the drought in the Nile basin
region.
The
Israeli role in the conflict between Egypt and the Nile basin countries
With the outbreak of the crisis between Egypt and
the Nile Basin countries, and the outbreak of the differences on the allocation
of Nile water to Egypt and Sudan, and the emergence of the hidden role of
Israel behind incite the Nile Basin countries of Africa "Ethiopia - Kenya
- Uganda Rwanda" to violate the International Convention on the Nile Basin
countries. The Nile basin crisis exposed the Zionist ambitions of expansion within the African continent, especially in
the countries of the Horn of Africa and Nile Basin countries, which are considered strategic for the
Zionist expansion in the
continent.
Israel's interest that the Nile River, which
represents the lifeblood of Egypt, gave the Jewish state's tactical and
strategic advantage during the previous wars with Egypt. In the war of attrition, for example, Israel has hit the dams
of Nag Hammadi and Esna, power lines, the link between Aswan and Cairo, which
prompted Egypt to change its plans and forcing it to send troops to protect the
higher dam against any Israeli attack, which led to reduce the pressure and
attacks of the Egyptian in the cannel line. Zionist plan on
Egypt, which comes within the scheme and the broader strategy, includes all
Nile Basin countries, pointing out that the successive waves of drought
suffered by the Nile Basin, in addition to high population growth in Egypt, led
to the inability of Egypt to provide self-sufficiency of food. And therefore relied on
other countries to provide food for its population. This made Egypt associated
with foreign countries and especially the United States, which is the largest
producer of food in the world.
The famous Israeli writer"Arnon Chauffeur"
said that as a result of the Egyptians dependence on the United States,
whenever it is in Israel's interests because U.S.A ensures the stability of the
peace agreement signed between the Cairo and Tel Aviv.
According to the Decree of the real Zionist plan, the water crisis in Egypt will led to carry out economic reforms and to rationalize water consumption. That may become a reason for the great cooperation between Egypt and Israel, because Israel possesses extensive experience in both areas and Egypt can benefit from it in this matter.
According to the Decree of the real Zionist plan, the water crisis in Egypt will led to carry out economic reforms and to rationalize water consumption. That may become a reason for the great cooperation between Egypt and Israel, because Israel possesses extensive experience in both areas and Egypt can benefit from it in this matter.
Also Israel has an interest of a water crisis in Egypt, because that
will push Egypt to engage in conflicts in this regard with its neighbors in the
region of the Nile Basin, which will reduce its intervention in the affairs and
issues of the Arab world. This is exactly what Israel wants. However,
Israel does not hide its concern that any water crisis may be exposed to Egypt
from the growing strength of extremist elements who oppose the peace agreement
with Israel.
Israel has tried to use Ethiopia
as a pressure on Egypt by Touch the Egyptian quota in the Nile waters and the
threat of building dams in the hand of
Ethiopian control the volume of water reaching to Egypt, especially that 80% of
the water reaching to Egyptian territories have their origin in the Ethiopian
highlands. Israel is also seeking to develop
plans to draw water from the Nile to its territory from the nearest point in
African countries that will threat irrigation and electricity, agriculture
along the Nile Valley and Delta of Egypt.
from another side D.R Alia el Mahdy confirm that according to the Israel's interest, Israel want to stop control of Arab States on the Red Sea .. So Israel is trying to impose its control and its influence on the not Arab countries bordering on the Caspian Sea and offer all the help they need. Especially the states of Eritrea and Ethiopia. which at the same time advantage to Israel because they are also Nile Basin countries, so Israel is interested in increasing the share of Ethiopia in the Nile water, because it means from the Israeli point of view re-division of shares of the basin countries in the Nile water fairly.
from another side D.R Alia el Mahdy confirm that according to the Israel's interest, Israel want to stop control of Arab States on the Red Sea .. So Israel is trying to impose its control and its influence on the not Arab countries bordering on the Caspian Sea and offer all the help they need. Especially the states of Eritrea and Ethiopia. which at the same time advantage to Israel because they are also Nile Basin countries, so Israel is interested in increasing the share of Ethiopia in the Nile water, because it means from the Israeli point of view re-division of shares of the basin countries in the Nile water fairly.
Ethiopia
that play a vital role in the rebellion revolution against Egypt figured from Israel with particular interest in Israel's
strategic around the African continent because of the
following reasons:
Zionist
claims based on myths and claim that the relationship with Ethiopia due to the
third century BC and claimed that the Son of Prophet Solomon (Menelik) of his
wife, Queen of Sheba is the founder of Abyssinia which was called (Mcda) and
national Amhara, which belonged to emperors Ahbash and most recently (Haile
Selassie) is a
descendant of Prophet Solomon.
Richness of Ethiopia's natural resources where they are in their territory many of the rivers (such as Abay, Tkaza, Parad, Amodu, Aoacho, Oceli) in addition to the lake (Tana) Great pose an enormous financial reserves of the Nile River , Ethiopia’s richest mineral resources industries that serve the Israeli military, including special, in addition to metals, diamonds, gold and silver.
The advantage of Ethiopia is strategically located geographic and demographic and political, they are having an impact on neighboring countries, especially Eritrea and the rest of the basin, in the case of Israeli control of influence in Ethiopia, the Egyptian national security is at a constant threat.
Richness of Ethiopia's natural resources where they are in their territory many of the rivers (such as Abay, Tkaza, Parad, Amodu, Aoacho, Oceli) in addition to the lake (Tana) Great pose an enormous financial reserves of the Nile River , Ethiopia’s richest mineral resources industries that serve the Israeli military, including special, in addition to metals, diamonds, gold and silver.
The advantage of Ethiopia is strategically located geographic and demographic and political, they are having an impact on neighboring countries, especially Eritrea and the rest of the basin, in the case of Israeli control of influence in Ethiopia, the Egyptian national security is at a constant threat.
Israeli imports doubled from Ethiopia more than thirty times during the
nineties, from 0.4 to 13.9 million dollars annually, while Israeli
exports have doubled in only three
times from 1.9 to 5.8 million dollars annually. In the same
context, according to media
sources, the Zionist Israeli companies specializing in the field
of engineering consultancy and construction recently
submitted bids for the Ethiopian Government with
proposals to contribute to housing investment
projects on the Nile, and the encouragement
of the Israeli Foreign Ministry[9]. The volume of economic cooperation
Israeli with Ethiopia, a remarkable development, with an export value of
Ethiopian to Israel for the years 1993 - 1998 rate increase and reached 230%
and that exports coffee, leather, school bags, shoes, vegetables, fruits, meat,
live animals, cotton, timber, gold, cobalt, black oil, sugar, cereals, and also the Ethiopian
Society of Commerce and the Ethiopian Export Agency and the Ethiopian embassy
in Israel play a vital roles in facilitating economic and trade cooperation
between the two countries. Israeli exports to Ethiopia have increased during
2003 to reach the rate of 500% in addition to increased military cooperation,
which revealed the Information Bulletin of the British military in June 1998
that Israel maintains intelligence links closely with Ethiopia, and the Israeli
Mossad runs a large cadre of collecting information and intelligence in the
capital Addis Ababa, in addition to his activities in the Island (Dahlak)
Eritrea and southern Sudan and the rest of the basin.
On the other hand
relations between Nairobi and Tel Aviv's rapid development in all fields of economic, agricultural, security .according to the data of Israeli Foreign Ministry
the Israeli imports from Kenya
have doubled twice and a half times in
the last three years from 8.6 to
20.9 million dollars
annually, while exports have increased Israeli Almost twice the $
14 million to
$ 29.3 million. Israel
has established strong ties with the State of Kenya, because of the headwaters
of the Nile there, as well as with Uganda that located close to the Lake
Victoria and Awan dam. DR.Emad Awad
confirmed that during the sixties and seventies Egypt afraid of Israel that may
close the dam (Awan) and therefore the flow of Nile water to Egypt will stop,
so Cairo send a team of experts and Egyptian specialists to Uganda till now to ensure the flow of the White Nile
on a regular basis.
Also
Uganda and Israel signed an agreement in March 2000, during the visit of a
delegation from the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, headed by the Director of
Irrigation in the Ministry, Moshe without Gulen, contain the implementation of
irrigation projects in ten provinces affected by drought, and send Ugandan
groups to Israel to complete the study of the projects, which is located mostly
in the districts of northern Uganda, near the Ugandan border with Sudan, Kenya,
and use of water flowing from Lake Victoria to the establishment of these
projects, which leads to lack of water received by the White Nile, as well as
Israel announced it was interested in the establishment of irrigation projects
in the province of Karamoja in Uganda , near the Sudan, where they can irrigate
more than 247 thousand hectares of land of Uganda through the use of two and a
half billion cubic meters annually, while water that currently used does not
exceed 207 million cubic meters only to irrigate 32 thousand hectares of land,
not only the seriousness of existence Israel in the countries of the Nile to
the use of experts and technical cooperation in the projects, but it extend to
the economic and agricultural cooperation by Israeli capital , aims to own land
in the region by the pretext of establishing projects, or improve its
territory, or the establishment of dams.
Overall, the goal of Israel's presence in Africa is the desire to get on
the Nile water, and pressure on the Egyptian decision-maker, because of the
sensitivity and gravity of the sheet of water in the Egyptian strategy, through
the adoption of Tel Aviv to play no direct role in water conflict between the
Nile Basin countries, take advantage of its
considerable influence in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, taking
advantage of U.S. support clear to her for joint control over the African
continent, which affects the basis for the national security of Egypt , which
makes it important to take swift action to curb this Israeli intervention , before it becomes a
real threat, threatening of all, and may index the recent crisis with the Nile
Basin countries for the good proof of that.
· Conclusion:-
The Nile River is
the only major source of water for the country, plays a crucial role in the
life of Egypt. As compared to the other riparian states, Egypt is the only
country that is heavily dependent on the Nile River waters, making Cairo
vulnerable to any actions that would jeopardize the flow of the Nile. The Nile
River will always be the parameter that influences Egyptian role and foreign
policy vis-à-vis the states in the basin region.
As a result of many internal and
external factors, the Egyptian role in the Nile basin region deteriorate, after
those countries gained their independence; they started development so those
countries needs from Egypt changed, from military support and assistance in
achieve independence to scientific and technical, economic support to achieve
the comprehensive development but there are a lot of issues attract the
Egyptian attention from the appearance in the Nile basin region effectively.
First, the decade of the 1980s was one of external shocks (in the form of
declines in oil prices, high interest rates and general economic decline in the
world economy. For example, in 1981, Egypt’s weighted average export price for
crude petroleum collapsed from $34 a barrel to $12 in May 1986. The Egyptian
economy did not respond adequately to these shocks. The consequence was massive
fiscal and current account deficits, which also paved the way for the
accumulation of external debt. Between 1980/81 and 1990/91, the country’s
external debt increased from $22.1 billion to $31.1 billion. At the same time,
budget deficit averaged 18% of GDP annually. The rate of inflation had risen to
more than 20% and open unemployment had risen to about 10% by 1990. in response
to the decline in the Egyptian economy during 1986-90 period, coupled with
massive fiscal and current account deficits, high inflation rates, negative
interest rates, accumulated external debt and high open unemployment, the
Government of Egypt (GOE) initiated the Economic Reform and Structural
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) for the period 1991/92 – 1992/93 with support of
World Bank, IMF, ADB and other donors.
Second,
- The assassination attempt of president Hosny Moubark 1995 in
Ethiopia (ADDIS ABABA) so visit any Nile basin countries during the last fifteen year and attending
any African summit stopped.
Third, the severe decline in the Egyptian economic and
political capacity,
as well as the injury of the political system in Egypt with a several disabled because of the absence of democracy and
human rights violations and widespread corruption, and the combination of
wealth and power and the spread of poverty, increased unemployment, low wages,
high prices and the spread of the protest movements of groups of socially
marginalized to claim their rights and the absence of institutions playing the
real role (the legislative institution - Persecution of power advocated the
independence of the judiciary , with the absence of a real role
organizations of civil society and political parties led by poor and closed on
itself by the actor is a tool for the police system.
All these problems
that afflicted the Egyptian people discovered
their dissatisfaction with the existing regime and its policies and
its lack of legitimacy because of rigging the election that led to losing the
strong role externally, there is no doubt that there is a close relationship
between the strength inside and outside force, and vice versa.
-Then there was the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the disintegration in
the early nineties and United States-led new
world order and the rearrangement
of regional systems for the
benefit of the United States, so the United States worked to
ensure the superiority of Israel over Arab countries, also worked to eliminate
any attempt to possess the power in the region ,With
the decline of the Egyptian role in the region other countries have activated
their roles like Israel that has an interest in making a conflict between Egypt
and the Nile basin countries to attract the Egyptian attention from the middle
east issues by play a vital role in the faces of support by provide economic
and political ,technical support that Egypt failed to provide effectively, this
policy of Israel helped in the change of the Nile basin countries attitude
toward Egypt that allowed to Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Uganda ,Burundi to sign the new CFA that want to redistribute the
Nile water , especially Egypt that rely on the water of the Nile more than any
other Nile basin state .
I argue that those countries can’t be
neglected by Egypt because it will be a threat to the Egyptian national
security, Egypt has to move faster and improve its appearance in the region by
improve its strategy and also the foreign policy toward these countries, by
intensification its role in the African organizations and in the Nile basin
initiative, try to satisfy their economic, technical needs and benefit
from them at the same time.
Appendix: - (sample questions asked
during the interviews)
What is the history of the Egyptian role in the Nile basin?
What is the change that happened in the world order before
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union?
What is the importance of the Nile as a factor in the
relationship between Egypt and the Nile basin countries?
What and when the turning point in the relation ship?
What is the change in the basin countries attitude and what
are the purposes of that?
What are the features of the deterioration in the role?
What are the features of Israel in the region and what is
its plan and interests in the region?
What is the different between the Israeli role and the
Egyptian role in the region?
What are the recommendations to improve the Egyptian role in
the region?
Bibliography :-
Books
1) Barbour, K.M, 1957, ‘A new Approach to the Nile Waters Problem’,
33, (3), July: 319-330.
2) Brunée, J. & Toope, S. J., 2002, ‘The Changing Nile Basin
Regime: Does Law Matter?’, 43, (1),Winter: 105-159.
3)
Himdan,
Jamal, 1987, ‘The Character of Egypt’, Cairo, AlamAl kotob, 2.
4) Hefny, Abu-Zeid, M., 1992, ‘Water Resources Assessment and
Management in Egypt during Conditions of Stress’, 41: 35-46.
5) Metawie, Abdel Fatah, 2004, ‘History of Co-operation in the Nile
Basin’, 20, (1), March: 47-63.
Electronic sources
Studies and reports
10)Sprout, H. and Sprout, M., 1965, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
10)Churchill, Winston, S., 2000, New York: Carroll Graf
Publishers.
11)Heikal, M. H.,
1978, ‘Egyptian Foreign Policy’, 56, (4), July.
12) Swain, Ashok,
1997, ‘Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt, the Nile River Dispute’, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 35, (4): 676-677.
13)Sprout, H. and
Sprout, M., 1969, ‘Environmental Factors in the Study of International
Politics’, in James N. Rosenau., International Politics and Foreign Policy
2nd ed., New York, Free Press: 41-56.
[1] Topography
is the shape or configuration of the land, represented on a map by contour
lines, hypsometric tints, and relief shading.
[2] Source: Karyabwite, Diana Rizzolio, Water Sharing in
the Nile River Valley (Geneva: UNEP/DEWA/GRID, January-June 2010), p. 33.
[3] (FAO
2010)
[4] World
Bank 2011: 48-50
[5]Karyabwite,
Diana RizzolioWater Sharing in the Nile River Valley, (Geneva:
UNEP/DEWA/GRID, January-June 2000), p. 25.
[6]
Hydro politics: the politics of water.
[7] Arsano
2007, 93
[8] MASHAV - Israel's Agency
for International Development Cooperation is responsible for Israel's
international cooperation and assistance around the world, through the
provision of guidance and training in Israel and abroad. The assistance is
provided in a wide variety of areas, including agriculture, medicine,
education, the advancement of the status of women, community and family.
[9]Patric,
terry, Israel and Africa Washington post ,USA ,2007
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